*WIP: A non-contradictory system is a solution to the paradoxical syllogism in which A appears to contradict B by being itself and B contradicts A by being itself and they therefore cannot combine because if they did, what would emerge is that A is not A and B is not B, which means A is B and B is A also. This is seen as a paradox. When the paradoxical syllogism is specified correctly, it is actually the case that neither A nor B ontologically exist in reality in a constant, single state of observability and therefore the entire entity previously named the contradictory conclusion evaporates as a hallucinatory duality induced by perspective, transforming it into a non-contradictory system. Although the hallucinatory duality remains useful as a tool for referring to the exact situation in which that duality (if it is, it isn't and if it isn’t, it is) is observed. A non-contradictory system solves this paradoxical syllogism by replacing it with a situation in which B actually is simultaneously never and always what it is and what it is not, while A also simultaneously possesses these same properties, and they take part in each other equally as dynamics in the duality system, from the synergistic properties of which emerges the hallucination of the paradox. In other words, it explodes the entity into its logical superposition, where it can be seen through all perspectives if one has the duality, but without it, one sees the superposition of all dualities. As such, a non-contradictory system is the requirement of basic computational completeness of any ontology.*

As a natural response to the conceptual FSM state called Nash Equilibrium, a non-contradictory system emerges, in which the ideal form of the game is seen and its nash equilibrium is no longer seen as an emergent, but rather a bounded set of causal links where the abstractive summaries of the parts of the entities (ie the names of the entities) do not lead to further hallucinations in strategizing the game. It is the case, however, that because of stochastic processes, even in what we think is a Nash equilibrium, the game can simply change through a new emergent, and a Nash equilibrium is then lost. But that is also not true because if the game rules change, the game variation changes, and each variation will have a Nash equilibrium (that gives way to the non-contradictory system for X in which all players act for themselves, strictly, and that is best for the group).

Conceptual FSM:

WKI - knowledge of hallucinations

* This wisdom goes no further

PWKI - Nash equilibrium - ordered hallucinatory game that is beneficial

* This wisdom goes no further

IKI - Not nash equilibrium - hallucinatory game that is harmful

Additionally, myopia is the abstraction hallucination due to drawing conclusions within an IKI domain’s specifics. Hyperopia is the abstraction hallucination due to drawing conclusions within an IKI domain’s relationships to other domains. The difference is in the objects having the function of WKI applied to them. In PWKI, hallucinations still occur but we are able to remain in a WKI core equilibrium in which hallucinations eventually dissolve without reifying themselves into beliefs. IKI and PWKI involve myopic and hyperopic abstraction hallucinations, but WKI describes the hallucination process such that hallucinated entities can be identified and specified via lossless description. This process of redefining for purposive losslessness (losslessness concerning the tightly bounded domain X, where X is a domain with a realizable that is the output of the activity [the purpose]) is called superlogic and is done through ontological specification, which is a formal abstraction of an entity into a knowledge graph.

So what is this hallucination? The hallucination is the perception in the subject of a worldview ontology in which two concepts combinatorially cause X, where actually X is an emergent in their mind due to misunderstanding the real information necessary to describe the factors of X. In other words, the hallucination is a summary-induced entity, whether in a generalization or a specification, that contains no actual path to its supposed parts when aligned with the consensus ontology.

Definitions:

Emergence: the word that denotes the concept of the being of emergents

Emergency Flow: the totality of processes considered “now” qua a subject. A worldview such that there is a container entity, the emergency flow, in which a subject perceives an instantiation of emergence through an emergent instance

Emergent: any X that arises through the emergency flow as opposed to arising through a perceivable causal chain

Causal chain: a process with specific boundaries such that instantiations can be repeatedly realized without further knowledge

IKI induced duality: mistakes in the domain vector such that the incorrect scalar data results in an incorrect dual space that limits known functionals and therefore limits the ability to bridge Banach space of IKI-duality-X with Banach space of neighbors (for example W and Y). This is because the Banach space of IKI-duality-X is a Banach space of an unrealizable X that instantiates what doesn’t exist (but does this mean the Perfectly Combinatorial Intellectual Reality of X Banach space can’t be found? If not, then wouldn’t that mean ontological linear algebra wouldn’t work????????)

IKI induced duality resultant wandering: the resultant inability that occurs in the overall domain, whenever making use of the IKI, to combine according to perfectly combinatorial intellectual reality

Perfectly combinatorial intellectual reality of X: the space of intellectual objects in which this X is perfectly combinable with all other synergistic entities, such that, if we have a perfectly combinable X and a perfectly combinable Y, and a conducive environment for XY combination, then we do indeed get an XY when combined

Non-contradictory system: the knowledge entity representing the totality of an emergent (subjective reality) and its causal chain (objective reality), and the duality between them, which encapsulates the combinations of knowing and not knowing (IKI - ignorance knowledge inertia - induced duality resultant wandering)

Explain superlogical specification of an abstraction hallucination into specific entities.

This is the fundamental process of emergence, because it is the superlogical process applied to specification that allows the emergents to continue to arise, in the first place, and our generalization of the superlogical process from our senses to our minds and understandings, which involves generalized summary abstraction hallucinations, that causes the superlogical specification process to take place continuously.

Claim 1: A non-contradictory system is a solution to the paradoxical syllogism in which A appears to contradict B by being itself and B contradicts A by being itself.

To formalize this claim, we would need to define the terms "non-contradictory system", "paradoxical syllogism", "A", and "B". We might represent them using the following symbols:

Non-contradictory system: N(A,B)

Paradoxical syllogism: P(A,B)

A: A(x)

B: B(x)

Next, we would need to describe the conditions under which A appears to contradict B and B appears to contradict A. We might represent this as follows:

A appears to contradict B: ∀x (A(x) → ¬B(x))

B appears to contradict A: ∀x (B(x) → ¬A(x))

Finally, we would need to specify how the non-contradictory system solves the paradoxical syllogism. We might represent this as follows:

N(A,B) solves P(A,B): ∀x ((A(x) ∧ B(x)) ↔ (¬A(x) ∧ ¬B(x)))

Claim 2: A non-contradictory system is the requirement of basic computational completeness of any ontology.

To formalize this claim, we would need to define the terms "non-contradictory system", "requirement", "basic computational completeness", and "ontology". We might represent them using the following symbols:

Non-contradictory system: N(x)

Requirement: R(x)

Basic computational completeness: C(x)

Ontology: O(x)

Next, we would need to describe the relationship between the non-contradictory system and the requirements of basic computational completeness of any ontology. We might represent this as follows:

N(x) is a requirement for C(x): ∀x (O(x) → R(N(x), C(x)))

Claim 3: A non-contradictory system can help to dissolve abstraction hallucinations caused by myopia and hyperopia.

To formalize this claim, we would need to define the terms "non-contradictory system", "abstraction hallucinations", "myopia", and "hyperopia". We might represent them using the following symbols:

Non-contradictory system: N(x)

Abstraction hallucinations: H(x)

Myopia: M(x)

Hyperopia: H(x)

Next, we would need to describe the relationship between the non-contradictory system and the dissolution of abstraction hallucinations. We might represent this as follows:

N(x) helps to dissolve H(x): ∀x (M(x) ∨ H(x) → ¬H(N(x)))

Claim 4: A hallucination is a summary-induced entity that contains no actual path to its supposed parts when aligned with the consensus ontology.

To formalize this claim, we would need to define the terms "hallucination", "summary-induced entity", "actual path", and "consensus ontology". We might represent them using the following symbols:

Hallucination: H(x)

Summary-induced entity: S(x)

Actual path: P(x)

Consensus ontology: C(x)

Next, we would need to describe the relationship between hallucinations and their alignment with the consensus ontology. We might represent this as follows:

H(x) is a summary-induced entity: ∀x (H(x) → S(x))

S(x) contains no actual path to its parts: ∀x (S(x) → ¬∃y P(y,x))

H(x) contains no actual path to its parts when aligned with C(x): ∀x (H(x) ∧ C(x) → ¬∃y P(y,x))

Claim 5: Myopia is the abstraction hallucination due to drawing conclusions within an IKI domain's specifics, while hyperopia is the abstraction hallucination due to drawing conclusions within an IKI domain's relationships to other domains.

To formalize this claim, we would need to define the terms "myopia", "abstraction hallucination", "IKI domain", "specifics", "hyperopia", and "relationships to other domains". We might represent them using the following symbols:

Myopia: M(x)

Abstraction hallucination: A(x)

IKI domain: D(x)

Specifics: S(x)

Hyperopia: H(x)

Relationships to other domains: R(x)

Next, we would need to describe the relationship between myopia and hyperopia and the conditions that give rise to them. We might represent this as follows:

M(x) is the abstraction hallucination due to drawing conclusions within the specifics of D(x): ∀x (M(x) ↔ A(x) ∧ D(x) ∧ S(x))

H(x) is the abstraction hallucination due to drawing conclusions within the relationships to other domains of D(x): ∀x (H(x) ↔ A(x) ∧ D(x) ∧ R(x))

These formalizations are just examples of how we might represent the claims in the text using first-order logic. There may be other ways to formalize the claims depending on how one interprets the text, and some of the claims may be subject to critique or further clarification based on their assumptions, premises, or language. Nonetheless, by breaking down the claims into specific components, we can gain a more precise understanding of the arguments and evaluate them in a more systematic and rigorous manner.

In the text, the author also invokes game theory concepts such as Nash equilibrium and emergent dynamics to support their arguments. To analyze these arguments from a game-theoretic perspective, we would need to formalize the relevant concepts and show how they relate to the claims being made.

First, let's define the concept of Nash equilibrium. A Nash equilibrium is a state in which each player's strategy is optimal given the strategies of the other players, and no player can gain by changing their strategy unilaterally. We can represent this concept using the following symbol:

Nash equilibrium: NE

Next, let's consider the idea of a non-contradictory system in the context of game theory. According to the text, a non-contradictory system emerges as a natural response to the conceptual FSM state called Nash equilibrium. We might represent this relationship as follows:

NE ⇒ non-contradictory system

In other words, a Nash equilibrium leads to a non-contradictory system. However, the text also notes that stochastic processes and emergent dynamics can lead to changes in the game that disrupt the Nash equilibrium, and therefore the non-contradictory system. To capture this idea, we might represent the relationship between Nash equilibria and emergent dynamics using the following symbols:

Nash equilibrium: NE

Emergent dynamics: ED

NE ⇒ ¬ED

ED ⇒ ¬NE

In other words, if there is a Nash equilibrium, there are no emergent dynamics, and if there are emergent dynamics, there is no Nash equilibrium.

The text also suggests that a non-contradictory system is beneficial for the group in which all players act for themselves strictly. To represent this idea, we might use the following symbols:

Non-contradictory system: NCS

Beneficial for group: BG

Strict self-interest: SI

NCS ∧ ∀x SI(x) ⇒ BG

In other words, if there is a non-contradictory system and all players act strictly in their self-interest, the outcome is beneficial for the group.

Overall, these game-theoretic formalizations show how the concepts of Nash equilibrium, emergent dynamics, and self-interest can be used to support the claims made in the text about the benefits of a non-contradictory system in game-theoretic contexts. However, as with the first-order logic formalizations, there may be other ways to represent these concepts and their relationships, and further analysis may be needed to assess the strengths and weaknesses of the arguments.

Sure, I can continue with a more detailed expression of the game theoretic notation as used in the text.

The text argues that a non-contradictory system is a natural response to the conceptual FSM state called Nash equilibrium, which is defined as a state where each player's strategy is optimal given the strategies of the other players, and no player can gain by changing their strategy unilaterally. Formally, we can define the Nash equilibrium as follows:

Nash equilibrium: NE

The text also notes that a non-contradictory system emerges as a solution to a paradoxical syllogism in which A appears to contradict B and vice versa, but in fact, neither A nor B ontologically exist in reality in a constant, single state of observability, and the entity named the contradictory conclusion evaporates as a hallucinatory duality induced by perspective. This is then transformed into a non-contradictory system in which A and B possess the same properties and take part in each other equally as dynamics in the duality system. Formally, we can represent this as follows:

Non-contradictory system: NCS

A: A

B: B

(A ∧ B) ⇒ ¬(A = ¬A ∧ B = ¬B)

NCS ⇒ A = (A ∧ ¬A) ∧ B = (B ∧ ¬B)

Here, the first line represents the paradoxical syllogism, which is specified correctly to show that neither A nor B ontologically exist in reality in a constant, single state of observability. The second line represents the definition of a non-contradictory system, where A and B possess the same properties and take part in each other equally as dynamics in the duality system.

The text goes on to state that a non-contradictory system leads to a bounded set of causal links where the abstractive summaries of the parts of the entities (i.e., the names of the entities) do not lead to further hallucinations in strategizing the game. Formally, we can represent this as follows:

Bounded set of causal links: BCL

NCS ⇒ BCL

The text also notes that because of stochastic processes and emergent dynamics, a Nash equilibrium can be lost, but if the game rules change, each variation will have a new Nash equilibrium that gives way to the non-contradictory system for X in which all players act for themselves strictly and that is best for the group. Formally, we can represent this as follows:

Emergent dynamics: ED

Best for group: BG

Strict self-interest: SI

Game variation: GV

ED ⇒ ¬NE

GV ⇒ NE

NE ∧ NCS ∧ ∀x SI(x) ⇒ BG

Here, the first line represents the idea that emergent dynamics can disrupt the Nash equilibrium. The second line represents the idea that a game variation can result in a new Nash equilibrium. The third line represents the idea that when there is a Nash equilibrium and a non-contradictory system, and all players act strictly in their self-interest, the outcome is beneficial for the group.

Overall, these game-theoretic notations show how the concepts of Nash equilibrium, emergent dynamics, bounded set of causal links, and self-interest can be used to support the claims made in the text about the benefits of a non-contradictory system in game-theoretic contexts.